diff --git a/docs/heicode-manager-standalone-execution-plan.md b/docs/heicode-manager-standalone-execution-plan.md
index 46d7eeca..86cf2f87 100644
--- a/docs/heicode-manager-standalone-execution-plan.md
+++ b/docs/heicode-manager-standalone-execution-plan.md
@@ -257,19 +257,19 @@
 
 | 项 | 内容 |
 |---|---|
-| 目标 | 明确桌面客户端调用 Manager 时，请求体当前依赖 HTTPS/TLS 传输加密；是否需要额外应用层 body 加密需单独评估，不默认混入 sub 敏捷接口 |
+| 目标 | 桌面客户端调用 Manager 的 sub 流程接口时，支持与模型调用一致的 V2 应用层 body 加密；浏览器后台页面继续兼容普通 HTTPS JSON |
 | 修改文件 | `docs/integration/heicode-desktop-sub-agile-api.md`、`docs/heicode-runtime-auth-newapi-secret-design.md`、必要时补充 `heicode/middleware` 或客户端 SDK 加解密模块 |
-| 当前现实 | 生产入口应使用 `https://code.xinghanlab.com`；JSON body 在网络传输中由 TLS 加密，到 Manager 后端后按普通 JSON 解析 |
+| 当前现实 | `/api/agnet/user/*` 与 `/api/heicode-auth/*` 已支持 `Content-Encoding: heicode-aead-v1`；Manager 会先解密并校验设备签名，再把明文 JSON 交给业务处理或代理给上游 |
 | 安全红线 | 请求体、回调、日志、artifact metadata、timeline 中禁止出现明文密码、Token、私钥、连接串、云 access key、模型 key；长期凭证只传 `secret_ref` |
-| 后续判断 | 如有合规要求再设计应用层加密，例如请求体 AES-GCM + 短期会话密钥/设备公钥；同时要设计密钥分发、轮换、重放保护、版本兼容和排障方案 |
-| 测试 | 检查生产 API 只走 HTTPS；敏感字段扫描；单测覆盖疑似明文凭据拒绝；如实现应用层加密，再补加解密兼容测试 |
+| 后续判断 | 桌面客户端需要在 sub 流程调用中复用模型调用的 encryptedFetch/V2 签名能力；服务端保留未加密 JSON 只用于 Manager Web 控制台兼容 |
+| 测试 | 单测覆盖 V2 malformed 请求拒绝、普通代理请求兼容；生产需用真实已配对设备发起加密 sub 请求冒烟 |
 
 验收标准：
 
-- 文档明确“HTTPS 传输加密已覆盖 body 在网络中的保密性”，不误导为当前已有业务层 body 加密。
+- 文档明确桌面端优先走 V2 应用层 body 加密，且保留浏览器后台未加密 JSON 兼容。
 - 客户端对接文档明确禁止传明文长期凭据，只允许 `secret_ref` / `lease://...` / 资源元数据。
 - 服务端日志不打印请求 body 中的敏感字段。
-- 如果后续实现应用层 body 加密，必须保留版本字段和灰度开关，避免旧客户端直接不可用。
+- V2 加密失败时返回 `X-Heicode-Auth-Error` 和 `X-Heicode-Server-Time`，便于客户端排障。
 
 ## 五、推荐执行批次
 
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ Manager 独立任务完成，不等于蜂群生产闭环完成。本文完成的
 | 幂等 | 重复回调不重复写入 |
 | 审计 | task/deployment/correlation_id 下能聚合审计、审批、artifact、callback |
 | 安全 | API、日志、页面不出现明文长期密钥 |
-| 请求加密 | 文档明确当前依赖 HTTPS/TLS 传输加密；应用层 body 加密如需实现，有清晰设计和兼容策略 |
+| 请求加密 | 桌面端 sub 请求支持与模型调用一致的 V2 body 加密；浏览器后台普通 JSON 兼容路径不受影响 |
 | 口径 | 页面和文档不把本地占位/模拟事件说成真实 Runtime |
 
 ## 八、执行时不能突破的边界
@@ -365,4 +365,4 @@ Manager 独立任务完成，不等于蜂群生产闭环完成。本文完成的
 5. 不把本地模拟事件当真实蜂群完成证据。
 6. 不把 Azure Key Vault 暴露成普通用户要直接操作的后台。
 7. 不绕过客户端高危审批的产品边界；Manager 只能先提供记录和 API。
-8. 不在未完成密钥协商、轮换和兼容设计前，临时硬塞应用层 body 加密，避免客户端和 Manager 联调不可排障。
+8. 不破坏 V2 body 加密的版本字段、诊断头、重放保护和未加密 Web 控制台兼容路径，避免客户端和 Manager 联调不可排障。
diff --git a/docs/integration/heicode-desktop-sub-agile-api.md b/docs/integration/heicode-desktop-sub-agile-api.md
index bdd099d5..f367689c 100644
--- a/docs/integration/heicode-desktop-sub-agile-api.md
+++ b/docs/integration/heicode-desktop-sub-agile-api.md
@@ -22,7 +22,59 @@ Manager 负责辅助控制面：任务草稿桥接、资源/权限、Agnet deplo
 | `/api/agnet/user/*` | Manager 用户态 Agnet 控制面，deployment、timeline、artifact、审批 | Manager 登录 session cookie + `New-Api-User: <user_id>` |
 | `/api/user/self` | 查询当前 Manager 用户 | Manager 登录 session cookie |
 
-### 2.2 Manager 用户态 Header
+### 2.2 桌面端请求 body 加密
+
+桌面客户端调用 Manager 的 sub 流程接口时，应优先使用与模型调用一致的 V2 加密请求协议。
+
+适用接口：
+
+| API 前缀 | V2 加密 body | 说明 |
+|---|---|---|
+| `/api/agnet/user/*` | 支持 | Manager 解密并校验设备签名后，按当前设备对应用户执行 |
+| `/api/heicode-auth/*` | 支持 | Manager 解密并校验设备签名后，把明文 body 代理给上游 HeicodeTask 服务；仍需携带 `heicode_access_token` |
+| 浏览器后台普通页面请求 | 兼容未加密 JSON | 不影响现有 Manager Web 控制台 |
+
+V2 请求头与模型调用一致：
+
+```http
+Content-Encoding: heicode-aead-v1
+X-Heicode-Device-Id: <device_id>
+X-Heicode-Timestamp: <unix_ms>
+X-Heicode-Nonce: <nonce_hex>
+X-Heicode-Fingerprint: <device_fingerprint>
+X-Heicode-Eph-Pubkey: <base64_x25519_ephemeral_pubkey>
+X-Heicode-Signature: <base64_ed25519_signature>
+X-Heicode-Client-Version: <desktop_version>
+Content-Type: application/json
+Accept: application/json
+```
+
+加密和签名协议沿用模型调用：
+
+```text
+body = nonce || ChaCha20-Poly1305(plaintext_json, aad)
+aad = device_id + "|" + timestamp + "|" + nonce + "|" + method + "|" + path_with_query
+
+canonical = method + "\n"
+          + path_with_query + "\n"
+          + timestamp_ms + "\n"
+          + nonce_hex + "\n"
+          + device_fingerprint + "\n"
+          + ephemeral_pubkey_b64 + "\n"
+          + sha256_hex(plaintext_body)
+
+signature = base64(ed25519_sign(device_private_key, sha256(canonical)))
+```
+
+`/api/heicode-auth/*` 额外要求：
+
+```http
+Authorization: Bearer <heicode_access_token>
+```
+
+原因：该 token 是上游 HeicodeTask 服务认证用；V2 设备签名只证明请求来自已配对的 Manager 桌面设备。
+
+### 2.3 Manager 用户态 Header
 
 调用 `/api/agnet/user/*` 时必须带：
 
@@ -35,7 +87,9 @@ Accept: application/json
 
 `New-Api-User` 必须等于当前登录用户 ID，否则会返回未授权。
 
-### 2.3 统一响应 Envelope
+使用 V2 加密 body 时，`/api/agnet/user/*` 可以不依赖浏览器 session cookie；Manager 会从设备绑定 token 中解析用户身份。为兼容当前 Web 控制台，未加密请求仍按 session cookie + `New-Api-User` 处理。
+
+### 2.4 统一响应 Envelope
 
 成功：
 
diff --git a/heicode/VERSION b/heicode/VERSION
index c514bd85..be05bba9 100644
--- a/heicode/VERSION
+++ b/heicode/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.4.6
+1.4.7
diff --git a/heicode/middleware/auth.go b/heicode/middleware/auth.go
index 29686abe..0f9992fc 100644
--- a/heicode/middleware/auth.go
+++ b/heicode/middleware/auth.go
@@ -203,6 +203,62 @@ func UserAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
 	}
 }
 
+func authenticateV2DeviceRequest(c *gin.Context) bool {
+	if err := DecryptV2RequestBody(c); err != nil {
+		common.SysLog("V2 body decrypt failed: " + err.Error() +
+			" path=" + c.Request.URL.Path + " ip=" + c.ClientIP())
+		SetV2AuthDiagnosticHeaders(c, err)
+		abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusUnauthorized,
+			common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenInvalid))
+		return false
+	}
+	token, err := VerifyV2DeviceSignedRequest(c)
+	if err != nil {
+		common.SysLog("V2 device-signed auth rejected: " + err.Error() +
+			" device_id=" + c.GetHeader(HeaderDeviceID) +
+			" ip=" + c.ClientIP())
+		SetV2AuthDiagnosticHeaders(c, err)
+		abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusUnauthorized,
+			common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenInvalid))
+		return false
+	}
+	if !applyTokenPolicyAndContext(c, token) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if err := SetupContextForToken(c, token); err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// UserOrV2DeviceAuth keeps dashboard session auth working while allowing the
+// desktop client to use the same encrypted body protocol as model calls.
+func UserOrV2DeviceAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
+	return func(c *gin.Context) {
+		if IsV2Request(c) {
+			if !authenticateV2DeviceRequest(c) {
+				return
+			}
+			c.Next()
+			return
+		}
+		UserAuth()(c)
+	}
+}
+
+// OptionalV2DeviceAuth decrypts and verifies encrypted desktop requests when
+// present, but leaves existing non-encrypted proxy requests unchanged.
+func OptionalV2DeviceAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
+	return func(c *gin.Context) {
+		if IsV2Request(c) {
+			if !authenticateV2DeviceRequest(c) {
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		c.Next()
+	}
+}
+
 func AdminAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
 	return func(c *gin.Context) {
 		authHelper(c, common.RoleAdminUser)
@@ -312,45 +368,7 @@ func TokenAuth() func(c *gin.Context) {
 		// verify the Ed25519 signature, and shortcut the rest of the
 		// legacy logic. See plan in ~/.claude/plans/peaceful-sprouting-crane.md.
 		if IsV2Request(c) {
-			if err := DecryptV2RequestBody(c); err != nil {
-				common.SysLog("V2 body decrypt failed: " + err.Error() +
-					" path=" + c.Request.URL.Path + " ip=" + c.ClientIP())
-				// Surface a machine-readable error code + server time so
-				// the desktop client can render an actionable message
-				// (e.g. "your system clock is X seconds off") instead of
-				// the generic "Token invalid" string. See plan v2 §
-				// "auth error UX" and HeaderAuthError contract in
-				// middleware/device_signature.go.
-				SetV2AuthDiagnosticHeaders(c, err)
-				abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusUnauthorized,
-					common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenInvalid))
-				return
-			}
-			token, err := VerifyV2DeviceSignedRequest(c)
-			if err != nil {
-				common.SysLog("V2 device-signed auth rejected: " + err.Error() +
-					" device_id=" + c.GetHeader(HeaderDeviceID) +
-					" ip=" + c.ClientIP())
-				SetV2AuthDiagnosticHeaders(c, err)
-				abortWithOpenAiMessage(c, http.StatusUnauthorized,
-					common.TranslateMessage(c, i18n.MsgTokenInvalid))
-				return
-			}
-
-			// Same downstream wiring as legacy: load user cache, group
-			// resolution, IP allowlist. Body has been replaced with
-			// plaintext so the relay handler sees normal JSON.
-			if !applyTokenPolicyAndContext(c, token) {
-				return // applyTokenPolicyAndContext already aborted
-			}
-			// Critical: V2 path must populate the same per-token context
-			// keys the legacy path does — token_key, token_name,
-			// token_quota, model_limits, ContextKeyTokenGroup, etc. —
-			// otherwise downstream Distribute / billing logic blow up
-			// with "record not found". This bug surfaced as HTTP 403
-			// new_api_error on every V2 chat call after device pairing
-			// finally started succeeding.
-			if err := SetupContextForToken(c, token); err != nil {
+			if !authenticateV2DeviceRequest(c) {
 				return
 			}
 			c.Next()
diff --git a/heicode/middleware/auth_v2_user_test.go b/heicode/middleware/auth_v2_user_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7dd8d4d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/heicode/middleware/auth_v2_user_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+package middleware
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"github.com/glebarez/sqlite"
+	"github.com/heicode/manager/common"
+	"github.com/heicode/manager/model"
+	"github.com/heicode/manager/service"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+func TestUserOrV2DeviceAuthRejectsMalformedEncryptedRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.POST("/api/agnet/user/tasks/:task_id/deployment-draft", UserOrV2DeviceAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true})
+	})
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(
+		http.MethodPost,
+		"/api/agnet/user/tasks/task-v2/deployment-draft",
+		nil,
+	)
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Encoding", V2ContentEncoding)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d; body=%s", rec.Code, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	if got := rec.Header().Get(HeaderAuthError); got != V2AuthErrorEphPubkeyMissing {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderAuthError, got, V2AuthErrorEphPubkeyMissing)
+	}
+	if rec.Header().Get(HeaderServerTime) == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s was not set", HeaderServerTime)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOptionalV2DeviceAuthAllowsPlainRequests(t *testing.T) {
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.POST("/api/heicode-auth/api/user/tasks/intent", OptionalV2DeviceAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true})
+	})
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/heicode-auth/api/user/tasks/intent", nil)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d; body=%s", rec.Code, http.StatusOK, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUserOrV2DeviceAuthDecryptsValidEncryptedRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	setupV2UserAuthTestDB(t)
+	gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+
+	deviceID := "device-v2-success"
+	fingerprint := strings.Repeat("c", 64)
+	_, privateKey, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate ed25519 key: %v", err)
+	}
+	publicKeyB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(privateKey.Public().(ed25519.PublicKey))
+	deviceIDCopy := deviceID
+	token := model.Token{
+		UserId:               42,
+		Key:                  "sk-v2-success-test",
+		Status:               common.TokenStatusEnabled,
+		Name:                 "v2 success test",
+		ExpiredTime:          -1,
+		UnlimitedQuota:       true,
+		DeviceId:             &deviceIDCopy,
+		DevicePubkey:         &publicKeyB64,
+		DeviceFingerprint:    fingerprint,
+		RequireDeviceBinding: true,
+	}
+	if err := token.Insert(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert token: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	router := gin.New()
+	router.POST("/api/agnet/user/tasks/:task_id/deployment-draft", UserOrV2DeviceAuth(), func(c *gin.Context) {
+		if got := c.GetInt("id"); got != 42 {
+			t.Fatalf("id context = %d, want 42", got)
+		}
+		var payload struct {
+			Objective string `json:"objective"`
+		}
+		if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&payload); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("bind decrypted body: %v", err)
+		}
+		if payload.Objective != "encrypted sub task" {
+			t.Fatalf("objective = %q", payload.Objective)
+		}
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"success": true})
+	})
+
+	path := "/api/agnet/user/tasks/task-v2/deployment-draft"
+	body := []byte(`{"objective":"encrypted sub task"}`)
+	req := newEncryptedV2Request(t, http.MethodPost, path, body, deviceID, fingerprint, privateKey)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d; body=%s", rec.Code, http.StatusOK, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func setupV2UserAuthTestDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+	common.UsingSQLite = true
+	common.UsingMySQL = false
+	common.UsingPostgreSQL = false
+	common.RedisEnabled = false
+
+	dsn := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?mode=memory&cache=shared", strings.ReplaceAll(t.Name(), "/", "_"))
+	db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(dsn), &gorm.Config{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open sqlite: %v", err)
+	}
+	model.DB = db
+	model.LOG_DB = db
+	if err := db.AutoMigrate(&model.User{}, &model.Token{}, &model.ServerKey{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("automigrate: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Create(&model.User{
+		Id:       42,
+		Username: "v2-user",
+		Password: "not-used",
+		Status:   common.UserStatusEnabled,
+		Group:    "default",
+		Quota:    1000000,
+	}).Error; err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("insert user: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := service.EnsureServerECDHKey(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ensure server ecdh key: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if model.DB == db {
+			model.DB = nil
+		}
+		if model.LOG_DB == db {
+			model.LOG_DB = nil
+		}
+		sqlDB, err := db.DB()
+		if err == nil {
+			_ = sqlDB.Close()
+		}
+	})
+	return db
+}
+
+func newEncryptedV2Request(t *testing.T, method, path string, plaintext []byte, deviceID, fingerprint string, signingKey ed25519.PrivateKey) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+	serverPubB64, err := service.GetServerECDHPublicKeyB64()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get server pubkey: %v", err)
+	}
+	serverPub, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(serverPubB64)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode server pubkey: %v", err)
+	}
+	ephPriv := make([]byte, curve25519.ScalarSize)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(ephPriv); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate eph private key: %v", err)
+	}
+	ephPriv[0] &= 248
+	ephPriv[31] &= 127
+	ephPriv[31] |= 64
+	ephPub, err := curve25519.X25519(ephPriv, curve25519.Basepoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("derive eph public key: %v", err)
+	}
+	shared, err := curve25519.X25519(ephPriv, serverPub)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("derive shared key: %v", err)
+	}
+	r := hkdf.New(sha256.New, shared, nil, []byte("heicode-aead-v1"))
+	key := make([]byte, chacha20poly1305.KeySize)
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, key); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("derive aead key: %v", err)
+	}
+	aead, err := chacha20poly1305.New(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("new aead: %v", err)
+	}
+	headerNonce := randomNonce()
+	timestamp := fmt.Sprint(time.Now().UnixMilli())
+	aad := strings.Join([]string{deviceID, timestamp, headerNonce, method, path}, "|")
+	aeadNonce := make([]byte, aead.NonceSize())
+	if _, err := rand.Read(aeadNonce); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generate aead nonce: %v", err)
+	}
+	ciphertext := aead.Seal(nil, aeadNonce, plaintext, []byte(aad))
+	encryptedBody := append(append([]byte{}, aeadNonce...), ciphertext...)
+
+	ephPubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ephPub)
+	bodyHash := sha256.Sum256(plaintext)
+	canonical := strings.Join([]string{
+		method,
+		path,
+		timestamp,
+		headerNonce,
+		fingerprint,
+		ephPubB64,
+		hex.EncodeToString(bodyHash[:]),
+	}, "\n")
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(canonical))
+	signature := ed25519.Sign(signingKey, digest[:])
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, bytes.NewReader(encryptedBody))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Encoding", V2ContentEncoding)
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderEphPubkey, ephPubB64)
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderDeviceID, deviceID)
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderTimestamp, timestamp)
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderNonce, headerNonce)
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderFingerprint, fingerprint)
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderSignature, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(signature))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	return req
+}
diff --git a/heicode/router/api-router.go b/heicode/router/api-router.go
index 3b5e44f6..b8c09e67 100644
--- a/heicode/router/api-router.go
+++ b/heicode/router/api-router.go
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func SetApiRouter(router *gin.Engine) {
 		// plus the login burst — CriticalRateLimit is for sensitive ops
 		// (login, password reset) and trips at ~5 quick page loads, returning
 		// 429 to a normal user. Upstream APIM rate-limits itself anyway.
-		apiRouter.Any("/heicode-auth/*proxyPath", middleware.GlobalAPIRateLimit(), controller.HeicodeAuthProxy)
+		apiRouter.Any("/heicode-auth/*proxyPath", middleware.GlobalAPIRateLimit(), middleware.OptionalV2DeviceAuth(), controller.HeicodeAuthProxy)
 
 		userRoute := apiRouter.Group("/user")
 		{
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ func SetApiRouter(router *gin.Engine) {
 
 		// Agnet user approval gates and short-lived credential leases.
 		agnetApprovalRoute := apiRouter.Group("/agnet")
-		agnetApprovalRoute.Use(middleware.UserAuth())
+		agnetApprovalRoute.Use(middleware.UserOrV2DeviceAuth())
 		{
 			agnetApprovalRoute.GET("/approvals", controller.ListAgnetApprovalRequests)
 			agnetApprovalRoute.POST("/approvals", controller.CreateAgnetApprovalRequest)