Files
heicode-mananger/heicode/controller/agent_template_handlers.go
T
chenchenandClaude Opus 4.8 f4968b8072 fix(agent): review fixes — deployable-template gating, stopped-status guard, UI consistency
Backend:
- loadAgentTemplate now requires status='active' — a known template_key can no
  longer deploy a template an admin deactivated (matches the client list).
- refreshAgentStatus no longer lets AM's eventually-consistent live status
  resurrect a user-initiated "stopped" agent.
- HeicodeStopAgent persists via field-level Updates (not a stale full-row Save),
  matching refreshAgentStatus discipline.
- Drop dead amStartResult.AccessToken field (AM's token is never used; HM mints
  its own per-agent token).

Frontend:
- deploy-agent statusLabel: add the missing pending/starting → 启动中 branch so a
  just-deployed agent isn't shown as raw English fallback.
- cockpit 最近部署: map template_id → Chinese template name (consistent with the
  deploy/status pages) instead of showing the raw key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-05 11:06:49 +08:00

424 lines
15 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/heicode/manager/common"
"github.com/heicode/manager/model"
)
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Template-agent client API (new model).
//
// User deploys a template agent from the web console; AM starts it with the
// selected bound resources injected as env and returns a unique subdomain +
// access token. The desktop client reads the agent list here, then connects to
// the subdomain directly over SSE. HM is NOT in the agent conversation path.
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// sealAgentToken encrypts the AM-issued access token before it is persisted
// (AES-256-GCM via CryptoSecret). Falls back to plaintext only if CryptoSecret
// is unset, so the token is never lost.
func sealAgentToken(token string) string {
if strings.TrimSpace(token) == "" {
return ""
}
sealed, err := common.SealWithCryptoSecret([]byte(token))
if err != nil {
common.SysLog("WARNING: agent access_token stored unencrypted (CryptoSecret unset?): " + err.Error())
return token
}
return sealed
}
// unsealAgentToken reverses sealAgentToken. If the stored value is not a sealed
// blob (legacy plaintext / CryptoSecret unset), it is returned as-is.
func unsealAgentToken(stored string) string {
if strings.TrimSpace(stored) == "" {
return ""
}
plain, err := common.UnsealWithCryptoSecret(stored)
if err != nil {
return stored
}
return string(plain)
}
// mintAgentModelToken creates a hidden, unlimited-quota sk- token for the user
// so the started agent can call HM /v1/* (OPENAI_API_KEY) and bill to the user.
// Returns the bearer value ("sk-<key>") and the token id (stored for cleanup).
func mintAgentModelToken(userID int, deploymentID string) (string, int, error) {
rawKey, err := common.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
return "", 0, err
}
now := common.GetTimestamp()
tok := model.Token{
UserId: userID,
Name: "agent:" + deploymentID,
Key: rawKey,
Status: common.TokenStatusEnabled,
CreatedTime: now,
AccessedTime: now,
ExpiredTime: -1, // never naturally
UnlimitedQuota: true, // bills straight from User.Quota
HideFromUserUI: true, // not a user-created key; don't clutter the token list
}
if err := tok.Insert(); err != nil {
return "", 0, err
}
return "sk-" + rawKey, tok.Id, nil
}
// revokeAgentModelToken deletes the agent's minted model token (best-effort).
func revokeAgentModelToken(tokenID int) {
if tokenID <= 0 || model.DB == nil {
return
}
if err := model.DB.Where("id = ?", tokenID).Delete(&model.Token{}).Error; err != nil {
common.SysLog("revokeAgentModelToken: " + err.Error())
}
}
// templateAgentResponse maps a deployed template-agent record to the client view.
func templateAgentResponse(row model.AgentDeployment) gin.H {
var bindingIDs []int
if strings.TrimSpace(row.BindingIDsJSON) != "" {
_ = common.UnmarshalJsonStr(row.BindingIDsJSON, &bindingIDs)
}
return gin.H{
"agent_id": row.DeploymentID,
"template_id": row.TemplateID,
"subdomain": row.Subdomain,
"access_token": unsealAgentToken(row.AccessToken),
"binding_ids": bindingIDs,
"status": row.Status,
"runtime_id": row.RuntimeDeploymentID,
"created_at": row.CreatedAtText,
"updated_at": row.UpdatedAtText,
}
}
// HeicodeListAgentTemplates is defined in agent_template_library.go (reads the
// HM-maintained agent_templates table, Chinese display).
// HeicodeDeployAgent: POST /api/heicode/agents
// Body: {template_id (= template_key), binding_ids:[...]}.
func HeicodeDeployAgent(c *gin.Context) {
userID := c.GetInt("id")
if userID <= 0 {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "authentication required")
return
}
var req struct {
TemplateID string `json:"template_id"`
BindingIDs []int `json:"binding_ids"`
}
if err := common.UnmarshalBodyReusable(c, &req); err != nil {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "invalid request body")
return
}
req.TemplateID = strings.TrimSpace(req.TemplateID)
if req.TemplateID == "" {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "template_id is required")
return
}
if req.BindingIDs == nil {
req.BindingIDs = []int{}
}
if model.DB == nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "database not initialised")
return
}
// Load the HM-maintained template (its .md definition is sent to AM).
tpl, ok := loadAgentTemplate(req.TemplateID)
if !ok {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "unknown template_id")
return
}
// Resolve selected bindings -> env (non-secret config + KV-resolved secrets).
// NEVER log env: it can contain plaintext secrets.
env, err := buildAgentEnvFromBindings(userID, req.BindingIDs)
if err != nil {
agentError(c, "RESOURCE_BINDING_INVALID", err.Error())
return
}
deploymentID := "dep_" + common.GetUUID()[:12]
bindingIDsJSON, _ := common.Marshal(req.BindingIDs)
// Mint a model key so the agent can call HM /v1/* (OPENAI_API_KEY).
modelKey, modelTokenID, err := mintAgentModelToken(userID, deploymentID)
if err != nil {
common.SysLog("HeicodeDeployAgent mint model token: " + err.Error())
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "failed to provision model key")
return
}
env["OPENAI_API_KEY"] = modelKey
// Per-agent client↔agent access token. HM mints a random secret, injects it
// into the agent env (AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN) AND returns it to the deploying
// client (the agent list's access_token). Only the user who deployed this
// agent receives the token, so only they can drive it: AM can verify the
// caller's token == its own env AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN locally (no HM round-trip),
// or call POST /api/heicode/agent-access/verify to let HM be the authority.
// AM may opt out of this entirely. HEICODE_AGENT_ID lets the agent name itself
// when calling the verify endpoint.
agentAccessToken := common.GetUUID()
env["AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN"] = agentAccessToken
env["HEICODE_AGENT_ID"] = deploymentID
// Ask AM to start the agent with the template definition (.md) + env injected.
result, err := amStartTemplateAgent(c.Request.Context(), amStartArgs{
ManagerDeploymentID: deploymentID,
UserID: strconv.Itoa(userID),
TemplateKey: tpl.TemplateKey,
AgentDefinition: tpl.Definition,
Model: tpl.Model,
Env: env,
CallbackURL: agentRuntimeCallbackURL(),
})
if err != nil {
revokeAgentModelToken(modelTokenID) // don't leak the minted key
agentError(c, "RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", "failed to start agent: "+err.Error())
return
}
now := agentNow()
nowMs := time.Now().UnixMilli()
row := model.AgentDeployment{
DeploymentID: deploymentID,
UserID: strconv.Itoa(userID),
TemplateID: req.TemplateID,
Subdomain: result.Subdomain,
AccessToken: sealAgentToken(agentAccessToken),
BindingIDsJSON: string(bindingIDsJSON),
RuntimeDeploymentID: result.RuntimeID,
Status: firstNonEmpty(result.Status, "running"),
ModelTokenID: modelTokenID,
CreatedAtText: now,
UpdatedAtText: now,
CreatedAtMs: nowMs,
UpdatedAtMs: nowMs,
}
if err := model.DB.Create(&row).Error; err != nil {
common.SysLog("HeicodeDeployAgent persist: " + err.Error())
revokeAgentModelToken(modelTokenID)
// We started an agent in AM but failed to record it: roll back the
// orphan so it does not leak/keep running with no Manager record.
if strings.TrimSpace(result.RuntimeID) != "" {
if delErr := amDeleteTemplateAgent(c.Request.Context(), result.RuntimeID); delErr != nil {
common.SysLog("HeicodeDeployAgent orphan cleanup failed: " + delErr.Error())
}
}
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "failed to persist agent")
return
}
common.ApiSuccess(c, templateAgentResponse(row))
}
// findUserTemplateAgent loads a deployed template agent owned by the caller.
func findUserTemplateAgent(c *gin.Context) (model.AgentDeployment, bool) {
var row model.AgentDeployment
userID := c.GetInt("id")
deploymentID := strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("deployment_id"))
if userID <= 0 || deploymentID == "" || model.DB == nil {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "deployment_id and authentication required")
return row, false
}
// template_id <> '' guards against touching a legacy task deployment of the
// same user through the new template-agent endpoints.
if err := model.DB.Where("deployment_id = ? AND user_id = ? AND template_id <> ''", deploymentID, strconv.Itoa(userID)).First(&row).Error; err != nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_CONFLICT", "agent not found")
return row, false
}
return row, true
}
// HeicodeListAgents: GET /api/heicode/agents
func HeicodeListAgents(c *gin.Context) {
userID := c.GetInt("id")
if userID <= 0 || model.DB == nil {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "authentication required")
return
}
var rows []model.AgentDeployment
// Only template-agent records (TemplateID set), not legacy task deployments.
if err := model.DB.Where("user_id = ? AND template_id <> ''", strconv.Itoa(userID)).
Order("created_at_ms desc").Find(&rows).Error; err != nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_CONFLICT", "failed to list agents")
return
}
items := make([]gin.H, 0, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
items = append(items, templateAgentResponse(row))
}
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{"items": items, "total": len(items)})
}
// refreshAgentStatus best-effort pulls the live status from AM and persists it.
// On any AM error it keeps the last-known status (never blocks the read).
func refreshAgentStatus(c *gin.Context, row *model.AgentDeployment) {
if strings.TrimSpace(row.RuntimeDeploymentID) == "" {
return
}
// A user-initiated "stopped" is a terminal intent: don't let AM's eventually-
// consistent live status (which may still report running/pending while the pod
// drains) resurrect it. Only delete (which removes the row) leaves "stopped".
if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(row.Status), "stopped") {
return
}
status, err := amGetAgentStatus(c.Request.Context(), row.RuntimeDeploymentID)
if err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(status) == "" || status == row.Status {
return
}
now := agentNow()
nowMs := time.Now().UnixMilli()
row.Status = status
row.UpdatedAtText = now
row.UpdatedAtMs = nowMs
// Field-level update (not Save of the whole row) so a concurrent stop/delete
// or other column write isn't clobbered by a stale full-row save.
if model.DB != nil {
_ = model.DB.Model(&model.AgentDeployment{}).
Where("deployment_id = ?", row.DeploymentID).
Updates(map[string]any{"status": status, "updated_at_text": now, "updated_at_ms": nowMs}).Error
}
}
// HeicodeGetAgent: GET /api/heicode/agents/:deployment_id
func HeicodeGetAgent(c *gin.Context) {
row, ok := findUserTemplateAgent(c)
if !ok {
return
}
refreshAgentStatus(c, &row)
common.ApiSuccess(c, templateAgentResponse(row))
}
// HeicodeGetAgentStatus: GET /api/heicode/agents/:deployment_id/status
// Pulls the live status from AM (is the agent running / crashed?).
func HeicodeGetAgentStatus(c *gin.Context) {
row, ok := findUserTemplateAgent(c)
if !ok {
return
}
refreshAgentStatus(c, &row)
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{
"agent_id": row.DeploymentID,
"status": row.Status,
"updated_at": row.UpdatedAtText,
})
}
// HeicodeStopAgent: POST /api/heicode/agents/:deployment_id/stop
func HeicodeStopAgent(c *gin.Context) {
row, ok := findUserTemplateAgent(c)
if !ok {
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(row.RuntimeDeploymentID) != "" {
if err := amStopTemplateAgent(c.Request.Context(), row.RuntimeDeploymentID); err != nil {
agentError(c, "RUNTIME_UNAVAILABLE", "failed to stop agent: "+err.Error())
return
}
}
now := agentNow()
nowMs := time.Now().UnixMilli()
row.Status = "stopped"
row.UpdatedAtText = now
row.UpdatedAtMs = nowMs
// Field-level update (not a full-row Save of a possibly-stale snapshot) — same
// discipline as refreshAgentStatus, so concurrent column writes aren't clobbered.
if err := model.DB.Model(&model.AgentDeployment{}).
Where("deployment_id = ?", row.DeploymentID).
Updates(map[string]any{"status": "stopped", "updated_at_text": now, "updated_at_ms": nowMs}).Error; err != nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "failed to persist stop")
return
}
common.ApiSuccess(c, templateAgentResponse(row))
}
// HeicodeDeleteAgent: DELETE /api/heicode/agents/:deployment_id
func HeicodeDeleteAgent(c *gin.Context) {
row, ok := findUserTemplateAgent(c)
if !ok {
return
}
runtimeCleanup := "ok"
if strings.TrimSpace(row.RuntimeDeploymentID) != "" {
if err := amDeleteTemplateAgent(c.Request.Context(), row.RuntimeDeploymentID); err != nil {
// Best-effort: still remove the local record so the user is never
// stuck with an undeletable row when AM's delete is unavailable/buggy.
runtimeCleanup = "failed"
common.SysLog("HeicodeDeleteAgent AM delete failed (removing local record anyway): " + err.Error())
}
}
if err := model.DB.Delete(&row).Error; err != nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "failed to delete agent")
return
}
revokeAgentModelToken(row.ModelTokenID) // invalidate the agent's model key
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{
"deployment_id": row.DeploymentID,
"status": "deleted",
"runtime_cleanup": runtimeCleanup, // "failed" => AM may still hold an orphan
})
}
// HeicodeVerifyAgentAccess: POST /api/heicode/agent-access/verify (public).
//
// The client↔agent access-control primitive HM provides for AM (optional). When
// the desktop client connects to an agent's subdomain it presents the per-agent
// access_token it got from the agent list. AM's agent can authorize the caller
// in one of two ways:
//
// ① Local (no HM call): compare the caller's token to its own env
// AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN — they are the same secret HM injected at deploy.
// ② Authoritative: POST here with {agent_id, access_token}. HM constant-time
// compares against the stored token and returns {valid, user_id} so AM also
// learns which HM user owns the agent.
//
// Only the user who deployed the agent ever receives its token, so a valid match
// means "this user is allowed to call this agent". No user identity is leaked on
// a miss. AM may ignore this entirely and roll its own scheme.
func HeicodeVerifyAgentAccess(c *gin.Context) {
var req struct {
AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
}
if err := common.UnmarshalBodyReusable(c, &req); err != nil {
agentError(c, "INVALID_REQUEST", "invalid request body")
return
}
req.AgentID = strings.TrimSpace(req.AgentID)
req.AccessToken = strings.TrimSpace(req.AccessToken)
if req.AgentID == "" || req.AccessToken == "" || model.DB == nil {
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{"valid": false})
return
}
var row model.AgentDeployment
if err := model.DB.Where("deployment_id = ? AND template_id <> ''", req.AgentID).First(&row).Error; err != nil {
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{"valid": false})
return
}
stored := unsealAgentToken(row.AccessToken)
if stored == "" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(stored), []byte(req.AccessToken)) != 1 {
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{"valid": false})
return
}
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{
"valid": true,
"agent_id": row.DeploymentID,
"user_id": row.UserID,
"template_id": row.TemplateID,
})
}