#37 shipped the telemetry retention task + model.DeleteTelemetryEventsBefore but
lacked a test for the deletion itself. Add TestDeleteTelemetryEventsBefore
(strict-< cutoff, retains at/after, idempotent) and migrate TelemetryEvent in the
model TestMain so it has a table.
Closes the "测试覆盖过期清理" DoD item of #43. Test-only; no behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Telemetry up-gating hardening (code portion of #32):
- Context field whitelist: telemetry `context` is filtered to a small set of
non-content diagnostic keys (route/retryable/phase/exit_code/duration_ms/
attempt) before persistence. Unknown keys — including potentially identifying
ones (email, full file path, prompt, raw IP) — are dropped, so a client
regression cannot land arbitrary JSON in the store. Empty/unparseable/no-allowed-key
context is dropped to "".
- Per-field size cap: stack_top and context are truncated to 8KiB after
redaction (backstop against unbounded blobs within batch limits).
- Retention: daily master-only task deletes telemetry rows older than
HEICODE_TELEMETRY_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30; <=0 disables).
HEICODE_TELEMETRY_RETENTION_INTERVAL_HOURS (default 24) sets cadence.
model.DeleteTelemetryEventsBefore(cutoff) + controller.StartTelemetryRetentionTask()
wired into main.go under IsMasterNode.
- GET /api/heicode/config telemetry block now surfaces retention_days for
client/admin transparency.
Tests: whitelist drop/keep, size cap, redaction-within-allowed-key. go build/vet
clean; controller telemetry tests pass.
Affects: Manager only (telemetry ingest + retention). No billing/consume-log
change (telemetry still never bills). Privacy-doc disclosure + production
enable-checklist portions of #32 tracked in heicodeDocs sync (#34) / desktop
client API docs (#35).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#31: HeicodeDeployAgent now refuses to deploy unless CRYPTO_SECRET is explicitly
configured, so the per-agent access_token is sealed with a key that survives a
container restart. common.CryptoSecret is never literally "" (defaults to
uuid/SessionSecret), so the sealAgentToken plaintext fallback was effectively
unreachable; the real hazard is an ephemeral random seal key making tokens
undecryptable after restart. Dev-only override: HEICODE_ALLOW_PLAINTEXT_AGENT_TOKEN_IN_DEV=true.
Verified prod container has CRYPTO_SECRET set (64 chars) -> deploy stays allowed.
#33: StartSecretPurgeTask refuses to start a whole-vault purge when
HEICODE_SECRET_PURGE_NAME_PREFIX is empty unless HEICODE_SECRET_PURGE_VAULT_EXCLUSIVE=true,
so HM never permanently purges another tenant's soft-deleted secrets in a shared
vault. Logs the resolved purge scope at startup.
Both gates extracted into pure, unit-tested helpers (agentTokenSealKeyConfigured,
secretPurgeScopeAllowed). Affects: Manager only (Agent deploy + Secret lifecycle).
No Client/Swarm/billing/audit schema change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Returns raw quota + the full conversion params (quota_per_unit, quota_display_type,
usd_exchange_rate) AND server-computed display_quota / display_used_quota, so the
desktop client renders correctly in USD / CNY / tokens without a ×500000 hack or a
missing-exchange-rate bug. Contract of record (server applies it):
USD : raw / quota_per_unit
CNY : raw / quota_per_unit * usd_exchange_rate
tokens : raw (no division)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- loadAgentTemplate now requires status='active' — a known template_key can no
longer deploy a template an admin deactivated (matches the client list).
- refreshAgentStatus no longer lets AM's eventually-consistent live status
resurrect a user-initiated "stopped" agent.
- HeicodeStopAgent persists via field-level Updates (not a stale full-row Save),
matching refreshAgentStatus discipline.
- Drop dead amStartResult.AccessToken field (AM's token is never used; HM mints
its own per-agent token).
Frontend:
- deploy-agent statusLabel: add the missing pending/starting → 启动中 branch so a
just-deployed agent isn't shown as raw English fallback.
- cockpit 最近部署: map template_id → Chinese template name (consistent with the
deploy/status pages) instead of showing the raw key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Token IS transmitted by HM (confirmed); the agent didn't enforce it because AM
hadn't deployed the image containing the §5 check to production. So the debug
log is unnecessary — removed. Contract §0.1 updated: token-check is "code-ready,
pending AM prod image", not a HM gap. UI access-token/direct-URL display kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- runtime: log the env KEY NAMES (never values) sent to AM on start, so we can
confirm AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN is actually transmitted without leaking secrets.
- web/运行状态: detail panel now shows the full direct-connect URL (copyable) and
the per-agent access token (masked + reveal + copy) with a hint that the client
sends it as X-Agent-Access-Token. These are what's actually needed to hand the
agent to a client / test it — previously only the bare hostname was shown.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
amStartTemplateAgent no longer claims OPENAI_API_KEY is uninjected or that
access_token is left empty for a future V2 path: the handler now mints +
injects both OPENAI_API_KEY and the per-agent AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN (forwarded
as-is), and HM returns its own access_token to the client.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
HM now mints a random per-agent access token at deploy, injects it into the
agent env (AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN + HEICODE_AGENT_ID) and returns it to the
deploying client (agent list access_token). Only the owning user receives it,
so only they can drive the agent — closing the gap where any valid sk- could
drive any agent and exfiltrate its mounted resources.
AM authorizes the caller either locally (compare to its env token) or via the
new public POST /api/heicode/agent-access/verify {agent_id, access_token} ->
{valid, user_id} (constant-time compare, no info leak on miss). AM may opt out.
Docs: AM contract §3.1 + client API §6 updated; access_token no longer empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1) Deploy Sub Agent: stop hiding resource types AM doesn't support yet (vm) —
show them but disabled with a "暂不支持" badge + tooltip, so users see their
bindings instead of wondering where the vm went.
2) Overview (概述/cockpit): replaced the old task-model status cards
(Running/Completed/Failed/裁决 + "code delivery runs") with template-agent
semantics — Agent 总数 / 运行中 / 启动中 / 异常, "最近部署 · 我的 Agent",
all Chinese. Dropped unused t()/useTranslation/PlayCircle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-add a run-status menu (I shouldn't have removed it) but showing ONLY what the
template-agent model actually has — no old 待确认/sub_agile/子任务流/智能体任务图/
产物/SK快照/合并时间线. New /agent-status page:
- summary counts (total / running / starting / other)
- agent list (template Chinese name, live status badge, subdomain, #resources)
- detail panel: live status (polls /agents/{id}/status from AM), copyable
subdomain, mounted resources (names from /api/resources), runtime_id, timestamps.
Sidebar item "运行状态" + zh key added; build + tsc clean; route registered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The old /deployments (运行总览) + /tasks/$id pages rendered the new template agents
with meaningless old sub-task fields (待确认/sub_agile/子任务流/智能体任务图/产物/
SK快照/合并时间线 — all empty). Removed the whole old-model UI cluster and pointed
the Overview dashboard at the real new endpoint:
- deleted features/agent-console, features/agent-hub, features/tasks and the
routes /deployments and /tasks/$id.
- cockpit (Overview) now lists deployed template agents from /api/heicode/agents
(status counts + recent agents), not the old listAgentDeployments.
- removed the "运行总览" sidebar item + dead /deployments links in footer /
top-nav / sidebar-config.
- routeTree regenerated; frontend build + tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deploy now also passes OPENAI_API_KEY (the 3rd of OPENAI_BASE_URL/MODEL_NAME/
OPENAI_API_KEY AM expects). HM mints a hidden, unlimited-quota sk- token for the
user per agent ("sk-"+key, billed to the user), injects it as OPENAI_API_KEY, and
stores the token id on the deployment. The token is revoked on delete and rolled
back if AM start / persist fails (no leaked keys). gateway accepts Bearer
sk-<key> (middleware strips sk-).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Preset templates carry a Claude-style frontmatter model (opus/sonnet) which is
NOT a model on the HM gateway. Passing it as MODEL_NAME would make the agent's
model calls fail. Now MODEL_NAME defaults to the gateway model gpt-5.4
(env AGENT_RUNTIME_DEFAULT_MODEL); a non-Claude-tier template model is honored.
Tests + AM contract doc updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/devices/logout (UserOrV2DeviceAuth): a device-signed client revokes its
OWN bound token via the signed X-Heicode-Device-Id (cannot touch other devices);
a session/JWT caller may pass {device_id}. Idempotent. The existing DELETE
/api/devices/:id revoke is session-only, so device clients had no self-logout —
this closes that gap. Documented in the client API doc §1.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Real test showed AM's DELETE /agents/{id} currently 500s (AM bug), which left the
HM record permanently undeletable. HeicodeDeleteAgent now treats the AM delete as
best-effort: on AM failure it logs + still removes the local record and returns
runtime_cleanup:"failed" so the user can always clear their list. (Stop stays
strict — AM has no /stop endpoint yet, pending their confirmation.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Real production test (user account) confirmed HM->AM POST /agents creates a real
agent (returned subdomain + status). But stop/delete still used the old
/api/agent/agents/{id} defaults and 404'd. Aligned status/stop/delete defaults to
the same namespace as create: /agents/{id}, /agents/{id}/stop. AM contract doc
notes these are HM's best guess pending AM's confirmation of the real lifecycle
endpoints (their doc only specified create).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adapt HM's template-agent integration to AM's actual CODING_A2A API (per their
doc), keeping it isolated in agent_template_runtime.go:
- start payload -> AM's POST /agents { name, template:"coding_a2a_agent",
framework:"A2A", config:{user_id,...}, env } with the template .md folded into
env.AGENT_INSTRUCTION_TEXT, template_key -> AGENT_ROLE_NAME, model gateway via
OPENAI_BASE_URL + MODEL_NAME (OPENAI_API_KEY left to the client per A2A request).
- response parse -> access_info.domain/external_ip -> subdomain, namespace/name
-> runtime_id; AM issues no access_token (client uses A2A api_key).
- env names aligned to AM: GIT_DEFAULT_BRANCH, POSTGRES_* (was PG_*),
AZURE_BLOB_ACCOUNT_NAME/CONTAINER/ACCOUNT_KEY (was BLOB_*); source keys aligned
to the resource-binding form (db_name/username/database_password/access_key).
Only AM-supported types (git/mysql/postgres/azure-blob); vm/redis/mongo/bucket
now rejected as unsupported until AM adds them.
- frontend: resources page splits DB into MySQL/PostgreSQL (correct provider),
drops vm; deploy page hides unsupported resource types.
- docs: AM contract + client doc updated to the real env names, payload, and the
A2A direct-connect (message/send · message/stream) + api_key auth.
- tests updated for the new env names + AM payload/response shape. All green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the last review finding: the AM-issued access_token was stored in plaintext
in agent_deployments. Now sealed with common.SealWithCryptoSecret on write and
unsealed on read — the client still receives the plaintext token (no contract
change), but a DB dump no longer exposes live agent tokens. Legacy/plaintext
values and an unset CryptoSecret degrade gracefully (pass-through). Round-trip test added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two review agents (backend + frontend) audited the template-agent feature. Real
findings fixed (verified the one false-positive — okOrThrow already reads the
top-level success because the response interceptor returns response, not
response.data):
Backend:
- buildAgentEnvFromBindings now filters status='active' so a revoked/disabled
binding can't still have its KV secret resolved + injected.
- same-type binding env collision (e.g. two git repos -> GIT_REPO_URL) now errors
instead of silently overwriting.
- refreshAgentStatus uses a field-level Updates (status/updated_at) instead of
Save(full row) to avoid clobbering a concurrent stop/delete.
- tests added: same-type collision rejected, inactive binding rejected.
Frontend:
- deploy/stop/delete now pass noBusinessError so the global interceptor stops
double-toasting the raw English backend message; okOrThrow+onError give one
friendly Chinese error. Extracted okOrThrow/noBusinessError into lib/api.ts.
- resources page revoke + create + KV-secret-write now check success (okOrThrow)
so a failed unbind / credential write no longer falsely reports success.
- clipboard copy wrapped in try/catch (no false "copied" on failure).
- resources group label shows Chinese resource-type names.
Go + frontend builds/tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full review of the template-agent code surfaced and fixed:
- [frontend, critical] deploy/stop/delete treated HTTP-200-with-success:false as
success (backend agentError returns 200 per new-api convention) -> a failed
call wrongly toasted success. Added okOrThrow() that inspects the envelope and
throws the server (or a friendly Chinese) message so onError fires.
- [frontend] "我的 Agent" showed the raw template key (architect) instead of the
Chinese name; now resolves name via the templates list.
- [backend] ensureAgentTemplatesSeeded consumed sync.Once even when model.DB was
nil (would permanently skip seeding) -> DB check moved outside the Once.
- [backend] AdminUpdateAgentTemplate could wipe name_zh/definition with empty
values -> guard those critical fields.
- [security] warn when starting an agent with secret-bearing env over a non-HTTPS
AM URL (secrets must not transit the network in clear).
Go + frontend build/tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
chenchen
