fix: align runtime create payload with agnet

2026-05-27 15:03:48 +08:00
parent 50b76dd4e6
commit beaf1e6611
8 changed files with 1189 additions and 10 deletions
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Heicode Manager 可独立执行任务计划

-更新时间：2026-05-26  
+更新时间：2026-05-27
 负责人范围：Heicode Manager 端  
 用途：后续开发按本文逐项执行、验收和更新状态。

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 | 11 | 前端页面补齐独立闭环展示 | P1 | 是 | 用户能看到任务、deployment、事件、artifact、审批和审计关系 |
 | 12 | 文档口径清理 | P2 | 是 | 避免旧 Vault/OpenBao/Secret Provider 表述误导 |
 | 13 | AWS/GCP 占位提示 | P2 | 是 | 避免用户误以为 AWS/GCP 已可用 |
+| 14 | 请求 body 加密策略确认 | P2 | 是 | 明确 HTTPS 传输加密、应用层 body 加密是否需要、敏感字段禁止入参和日志 |

 ## 四、任务明细

@@ -252,6 +253,24 @@
 - 禁用项不能提交到后端创建真实资源发现。
 - 已有 Azure 流程不受影响。

+### 任务 14：请求 body 加密策略确认
+
+| 项 | 内容 |
+|---|---|
+| 目标 | 明确桌面客户端调用 Manager 时，请求体当前依赖 HTTPS/TLS 传输加密；是否需要额外应用层 body 加密需单独评估，不默认混入 sub 敏捷接口 |
+| 修改文件 | `docs/integration/heicode-desktop-sub-agile-api.md`、`docs/heicode-runtime-auth-newapi-secret-design.md`、必要时补充 `heicode/middleware` 或客户端 SDK 加解密模块 |
+| 当前现实 | 生产入口应使用 `https://code.xinghanlab.com`；JSON body 在网络传输中由 TLS 加密，到 Manager 后端后按普通 JSON 解析 |
+| 安全红线 | 请求体、回调、日志、artifact metadata、timeline 中禁止出现明文密码、Token、私钥、连接串、云 access key、模型 key；长期凭证只传 `secret_ref` |
+| 后续判断 | 如有合规要求再设计应用层加密，例如请求体 AES-GCM + 短期会话密钥/设备公钥；同时要设计密钥分发、轮换、重放保护、版本兼容和排障方案 |
+| 测试 | 检查生产 API 只走 HTTPS；敏感字段扫描；单测覆盖疑似明文凭据拒绝；如实现应用层加密，再补加解密兼容测试 |
+
+验收标准：
+
+- 文档明确“HTTPS 传输加密已覆盖 body 在网络中的保密性”，不误导为当前已有业务层 body 加密。
+- 客户端对接文档明确禁止传明文长期凭据，只允许 `secret_ref` / `lease://...` / 资源元数据。
+- 服务端日志不打印请求 body 中的敏感字段。
+- 如果后续实现应用层 body 加密，必须保留版本字段和灰度开关，避免旧客户端直接不可用。
+
 ## 五、推荐执行批次

 ### 批次 A：最小 Manager 闭环
@@ -285,6 +304,7 @@
 | 3 | 前端闭环展示 |
 | 4 | 文档口径清理 |
 | 5 | AWS/GCP 占位提示 |
+| 6 | 请求 body 加密策略确认 |

 完成批次 C 后，Manager 端应具备清晰的任务视角、持久化上下文、准确页面口径和更少误导。

@@ -333,6 +353,7 @@ Manager 独立任务完成，不等于蜂群生产闭环完成。本文完成的
 | 幂等 | 重复回调不重复写入 |
 | 审计 | task/deployment/correlation_id 下能聚合审计、审批、artifact、callback |
 | 安全 | API、日志、页面不出现明文长期密钥 |
+| 请求加密 | 文档明确当前依赖 HTTPS/TLS 传输加密；应用层 body 加密如需实现，有清晰设计和兼容策略 |
 | 口径 | 页面和文档不把本地占位/模拟事件说成真实 Runtime |

 ## 八、执行时不能突破的边界
@@ -344,4 +365,4 @@ Manager 独立任务完成，不等于蜂群生产闭环完成。本文完成的
 5. 不把本地模拟事件当真实蜂群完成证据。
 6. 不把 Azure Key Vault 暴露成普通用户要直接操作的后台。
 7. 不绕过客户端高危审批的产品边界；Manager 只能先提供记录和 API。
-
+8. 不在未完成密钥协商、轮换和兼容设计前，临时硬塞应用层 body 加密，避免客户端和 Manager 联调不可排障。
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@

 **阻塞解除条件**：
 - agent-manager 侧给 mcp-server 派发 service token
- mcp-server 把 stub 换成对 `20.212.121.126:80` 的真实转发（HTTP/80，Host 头 `agent-manager.taijiagnet.com`）
+- mcp-server 把 stub 换成对 `http://20.212.121.126` 的真实转发；域名 `agent-manager.taijiagnet.com` 的 DNS / HTTPS 后续单独修复，不作为当前联调阻塞项

 Manager 前端已按 §5 契约消费，stub → 真实数据无需前端改动。

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.4.5
+1.4.6
@@ -359,6 +359,15 @@ func TestAgnetRuntimeShadowCreateStoresRuntimeMapping(t *testing.T) {
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 		require.Contains(t, string(body), `"sub_mode":"agile"`)
 		require.Contains(t, string(body), `"manager_deployment_id"`)
+		var runtimeBody map[string]any
+		require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(body, &runtimeBody))
+		agents := runtimeBody["agents"].([]any)
+		require.Equal(t, "builder", agents[0].(map[string]any)["role"])
+		metadata := runtimeBody["metadata"].(map[string]any)
+		require.NotEmpty(t, metadata["manager_deployment_id"])
+		grants := runtimeBody["resource_grants"].([]any)
+		require.NotEmpty(t, grants)
+		require.NotEmpty(t, grants[0].(map[string]any)["ref"])
 		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success":true,"data":{"deployment_id":"runtime-dep-1","swarm_id":"swarm-1","runtime_status":"accepted"}}`))
 	}))
@@ -128,6 +128,123 @@ func agnetRuntimeHeaders(req *http.Request, cfg agnetRuntimeConfig, record agnet
 	}
 }

+func agnetRuntimeRequestAgents(plan agnetOrchestrationPlan) []gin.H {
+	byRole := make(map[string]agnetAgentPlan, len(plan.Agents))
+	for _, agent := range plan.Agents {
+		role := strings.TrimSpace(agent.RoleTemplate)
+		if role != "" {
+			byRole[role] = agent
+		}
+	}
+
+	items := make([]gin.H, 0, len(plan.AgentRuntime.Agents))
+	for _, runtimeAgent := range plan.AgentRuntime.Agents {
+		role := strings.TrimSpace(runtimeAgent.Role)
+		if role == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		item := gin.H{"role": role}
+		if agent, ok := byRole[role]; ok {
+			if len(agent.SKSources) > 0 {
+				item["sk_sources"] = agent.SKSources
+			}
+			if len(agent.ResourceGrants) > 0 {
+				item["resource_grants"] = agnetRuntimeResourceGrantPayloads(agent.ResourceGrants)
+			}
+		}
+		items = append(items, item)
+	}
+
+	if len(items) > 0 {
+		return items
+	}
+	for _, agent := range plan.Agents {
+		role := strings.TrimSpace(agent.RoleTemplate)
+		if role == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		item := gin.H{"role": role}
+		if len(agent.SKSources) > 0 {
+			item["sk_sources"] = agent.SKSources
+		}
+		if len(agent.ResourceGrants) > 0 {
+			item["resource_grants"] = agnetRuntimeResourceGrantPayloads(agent.ResourceGrants)
+		}
+		items = append(items, item)
+	}
+	return items
+}
+
+func agnetRuntimeResourceGrantPayloads(grants []agnetResourceGrant) []gin.H {
+	items := make([]gin.H, 0, len(grants))
+	for _, grant := range grants {
+		secretRef := strings.TrimSpace(grant.SecretRef)
+		if secretRef == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		item := gin.H{
+			"grant_id":          grant.GrantID,
+			"resource_id":       grant.ResourceID,
+			"resource_type":     grant.ResourceType,
+			"type":              grant.ResourceType,
+			"user_id":           grant.UserID,
+			"binding_scope":     grant.BindingScope,
+			"target_role":       grant.TargetRole,
+			"target_agent_ref":  grant.TargetAgentRef,
+			"permission_scope":  grant.PermissionScope,
+			"permissions":       grant.PermissionScope,
+			"status":            grant.Status,
+			"ref":               secretRef,
+			"secret_ref":        secretRef,
+			"allowed_ref":       agnetGrantResourceRef(grant),
+			"resource_ref_hint": agnetGrantResourceRef(grant),
+		}
+		if grant.TenantID != "" {
+			item["tenant_id"] = grant.TenantID
+		}
+		if grant.ProjectID != "" {
+			item["project_id"] = grant.ProjectID
+		}
+		if len(grant.Constraints) > 0 {
+			item["constraints"] = grant.Constraints
+		}
+		if len(grant.Metadata) > 0 {
+			item["metadata"] = grant.Metadata
+		}
+		if len(grant.Audit) > 0 {
+			item["audit"] = grant.Audit
+		}
+		items = append(items, item)
+	}
+	return items
+}
+
+func agnetRuntimeRequestResourceGrants(plan agnetOrchestrationPlan) []gin.H {
+	items := make([]agnetResourceGrant, 0, len(plan.ResourceGrants))
+	items = append(items, plan.ResourceGrants...)
+	for _, agent := range plan.Agents {
+		items = append(items, agent.ResourceGrants...)
+	}
+	return agnetRuntimeResourceGrantPayloads(items)
+}
+
+func agnetRuntimeRequestMetadata(record agnetDeploymentRecord, source string) gin.H {
+	metadata := gin.H{
+		"correlation_id":         record.Plan.Metadata.CorrelationID,
+		"manager_deployment_id":  record.DeploymentID,
+		"source":                 source,
+		"heicode_deployment_id":  record.DeploymentID,
+		"heicode_runtime_bridge": true,
+	}
+	if record.Plan.Metadata.TenantID != "" {
+		metadata["tenant_id"] = record.Plan.Metadata.TenantID
+	}
+	if record.Plan.Metadata.ProjectID != "" {
+		metadata["project_id"] = record.Plan.Metadata.ProjectID
+	}
+	return metadata
+}
+
 func agnetRuntimeCreatePayload(record agnetDeploymentRecord, source string) gin.H {
 	callback := gin.H{
 		"url":               agnetRuntimeCallbackURL(),
@@ -137,11 +254,16 @@ func agnetRuntimeCreatePayload(record agnetDeploymentRecord, source string) gin.
 		callback["signing_secret_ref"] = ref
 	}
 	return gin.H{
-		"deployment_id":         record.DeploymentID,
-		"manager_deployment_id": record.DeploymentID,
-		"source":                source,
-		"callback":              callback,
-		"orchestration_plan":    record.Plan,
+		"orchestration_plan": record.Plan,
+		"agents":             agnetRuntimeRequestAgents(record.Plan),
+		"risk_level":         record.Plan.RiskLevel,
+		"budget":             record.Plan.Budget,
+		"billing_context":    record.Plan.BillingContext,
+		"resource_grants":    agnetRuntimeRequestResourceGrants(record.Plan),
+		"callback":           callback,
+		"agile_context":      record.Plan.AgileContext,
+		"sub_mode":           record.Plan.SubMode,
+		"metadata":           agnetRuntimeRequestMetadata(record, source),
 	}
 }

@@ -52,6 +52,14 @@ services:
      # the VM managed identity. No static secret-store token is required.
      - AZURE_KEY_VAULT_URL=${AZURE_KEY_VAULT_URL:-}
      - AZURE_CLIENT_ID=${AZURE_CLIENT_ID:-}
+      # Agent Manager Runtime: use the current production IP directly.
+      # The public domain is not used until DNS/HTTPS is fixed.
+      - AGNET_RUNTIME_ENABLED=${AGNET_RUNTIME_ENABLED:-false}
+      - AGNET_RUNTIME_BASE_URL=${AGNET_RUNTIME_BASE_URL:-http://20.212.121.126}
+      - AGNET_RUNTIME_CREATE_PATH=${AGNET_RUNTIME_CREATE_PATH:-/api/agnet/deployments}
+      - AGNET_RUNTIME_HEALTH_PATH=${AGNET_RUNTIME_HEALTH_PATH:-/api/agnet/health}
+      - AGNET_RUNTIME_SERVICE_TOKEN=${AGNET_RUNTIME_SERVICE_TOKEN:-}
+      - AGNET_RUNTIME_CALLBACK_SIGNING_SECRET_REF=${AGNET_RUNTIME_CALLBACK_SIGNING_SECRET_REF:-}
    networks:
      - heicode-network
    healthcheck:
@@ -125,6 +125,15 @@ func TestAgnetRuntimeRealHTTPHealthAndShadowCreateSmoke(t *testing.T) {
 			require.Contains(t, string(body), `"manager_deployment_id"`)
 			require.Contains(t, string(body), `"signing_secret_ref":"azkv://heicode-kv.vault.azure.net/secrets/callback-signing"`)
 			require.Contains(t, string(body), `"subscribed_events"`)
+			var runtimeBody map[string]any
+			require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(body, &runtimeBody))
+			agents := runtimeBody["agents"].([]any)
+			require.Equal(t, "builder", agents[0].(map[string]any)["role"])
+			grants := runtimeBody["resource_grants"].([]any)
+			require.NotEmpty(t, grants)
+			require.NotEmpty(t, grants[0].(map[string]any)["ref"])
+			metadata := runtimeBody["metadata"].(map[string]any)
+			require.NotEmpty(t, metadata["manager_deployment_id"])
 			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"success":true,"data":{"deployment_id":"runtime-http-dep","swarm_id":"runtime-http-swarm","runtime_status":"accepted"}}`))
 		default:
@@ -159,7 +168,7 @@ func TestAgnetRuntimeRealHTTPHealthAndShadowCreateSmoke(t *testing.T) {
 			"billing_context":{"provider":"newapi","newapi_user_ref":"newapi-http-smoke"},
 			"agile_context":{"iteration":"2026-05-27~2026-05-28","stage":"development","checkpoint":"ready_for_test","acceptance_criteria":["接口返回成功"],"next_action":"submit_test_result","requires_user_approval":false},
 			"agent_runtime":{"platform":"agnet","agents":[{"role":"builder","model_ref":"model-http-smoke","instance_count":1}]},
-			"agents":[{"role_template":"builder","goal":"smoke","default_model_id":"model-http-smoke","resource_grants":[{"grant_id":"grant-http-doc","resource_id":"doc-http","resource_type":"project_doc","user_id":"101","binding_scope":"task-http-smoke","target_role":"builder","target_agent_ref":"agent-builder-1","permission_scope":["doc:read"],"status":"active"}]}],
+			"agents":[{"role_template":"builder","goal":"smoke","default_model_id":"model-http-smoke","resource_grants":[{"grant_id":"grant-http-git","resource_id":"git-http","resource_type":"git","user_id":"101","binding_scope":"https://example.invalid/heicode/smoke.git#main","target_role":"builder","target_agent_ref":"agent-builder-1","permission_scope":["repo:read"],"metadata":{"repo_url":"https://example.invalid/heicode/smoke.git"},"secret_ref":"azkv://heicode-kv.vault.azure.net/secrets/http-smoke-git","status":"active"}]}],
 			"constraints":{"allowed_model_ids":["model-http-smoke"]},
 			"metadata":{"correlation_id":"corr-http-smoke"}
 		}
@@ -1 +1 @@
 .4.5
 .4.6