feat(preflight): confirm + audit + tamper-proof version check (#41)

完成 preflight EPIC(#29)的最后一子项 #41:

- POST /api/heicode/preflight/confirm:重算摘要 → 仅 ready 时可确认 → 派生防篡改
  版本哈希 → 写审计事件 preflight.confirmed(谁/何时/哪个 version)→ 返回 version。
- 防篡改版本 computePreflightVersion:在**稳定安全面**(template + 资源
  binding_id/type/provider/name/status/has_secret + 高危 enum + 必需缺失项)上做
  sha256,刻意排除易变预算数字/agent_slot,避免版本无意义抖动。
- 部署校验:POST /api/heicode/agents 新增可选 preflight_version。默认仅在带了它时
  校验(向后兼容);HEICODE_PREFLIGHT_REQUIRED=true 时强制。确认后资源/模板/高危面
  漂移或被篡改 → 版本不匹配 → 部署拒绝。
- 重构:抽出 buildPreflightSummary(GET/confirm/deploy 共用);GET 现也回 version。

测试:版本确定性/稳定性(不随预算变)、资源篡改翻转版本、normalizeBindingIDs。
go build/vet 干净,controller preflight 测试全过。文档 §4.1/§4.1.1 更新。

Affects: Manager only(新增 confirm 端点 + 部署可选校验,默认向后兼容)。
无计费/审计 schema 改动(复用既有 agent_audit_events)。

Closes #41

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-10 12:55:40 +08:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent c39ed6a070
commit 9a073e5b41
5 changed files with 273 additions and 32 deletions
+197 -26
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
package controller
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -93,7 +96,105 @@ type preflightSummary struct {
HighRiskOps []preflightHighRisk `json:"high_risk_ops"`
Budget preflightBudget `json:"budget"`
ApprovalPolicy gin.H `json:"approval_policy"`
Ready bool `json:"ready"` // 缺失项为空 + agent 配额未满
Ready bool `json:"ready"` // 缺失项为空 + agent 配额未满
Version string `json:"version,omitempty"` // 防篡改摘要版本(#41);由稳定子集派生
}
// confirmBindingIDs 返回摘要里有效(已解析)资源的绑定 id,用于审计记录。
func (s preflightSummary) confirmBindingIDs() []int {
ids := make([]int, 0, len(s.Resources))
for _, r := range s.Resources {
ids = append(ids, r.BindingID)
}
return ids
}
// computePreflightVersion 在摘要的**安全相关且稳定**子集上派生版本哈希(#41):
// template_id + 资源(binding_id/type/provider/name/status/has_secret)+ 高危操作 +
// 必需资源类缺失项。**刻意排除**易变的预算数字(remaining_quota 随每次调用变化)与
// budget/agent_slot 缺失项,否则版本会无意义地频繁变化导致部署总被拒。资源(增删/改类型/
// 改 secret)或高危面变化 → 哈希变化 → 部署校验拒绝(防篡改 / 防漂移)。
func computePreflightVersion(s preflightSummary) string {
parts := make([]string, 0, len(s.Resources)+len(s.HighRiskOps)+len(s.Missing)+1)
parts = append(parts, "tpl="+s.TemplateID)
res := make([]string, 0, len(s.Resources))
for _, r := range s.Resources {
res = append(res, strconv.Itoa(r.BindingID)+":"+r.Type+":"+r.Provider+":"+r.Name+":"+r.Status+":"+boolStr(r.HasSecret))
}
sort.Strings(res)
parts = append(parts, "res=["+strings.Join(res, ",")+"]")
ops := make([]string, 0, len(s.HighRiskOps))
for _, h := range s.HighRiskOps {
ops = append(ops, h.Op)
}
sort.Strings(ops)
parts = append(parts, "risk=["+strings.Join(ops, ",")+"]")
// 仅纳入「必需资源类」缺失(git/sk/project_document/cloud_account),排除 budget/agent_slot。
miss := make([]string, 0)
for _, m := range s.Missing {
if m.Kind != "budget" && m.Kind != "agent_slot" {
miss = append(miss, m.Kind)
}
}
sort.Strings(miss)
parts = append(parts, "missing=["+strings.Join(miss, ",")+"]")
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.Join(parts, "|")))
return "pfv1_" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:32]
}
func boolStr(b bool) string {
if b {
return "1"
}
return "0"
}
// withPreflightVersion 在摘要上填入版本哈希后返回(GET / confirm 都用)。
func withPreflightVersion(s preflightSummary) preflightSummary {
s.Version = computePreflightVersion(s)
return s
}
// verifyDeployPreflight 在部署时执行 #41 的防篡改确认校验。返回 (allowed, message):
// - HEICODE_PREFLIGHT_REQUIRED=true:必须带匹配的 preflight_version;
// - 否则:若客户端带了 preflight_version 则必须与实时状态匹配(漂移/篡改防护);未带则放行(向后兼容)。
//
// "匹配" = 用**当前**(模板、绑定、安全面)重算的版本等于传入版本。确认后任何对已绑资源/模板/
// 高危面的改动都会翻转哈希并拒绝部署。
func verifyDeployPreflight(userID int, templateID string, bindingIDs []int, providedVersion string) (bool, string) {
required := common.GetEnvOrDefaultBool("HEICODE_PREFLIGHT_REQUIRED", false)
providedVersion = strings.TrimSpace(providedVersion)
if providedVersion == "" {
if required {
return false, "preflight confirmation required: call POST /api/heicode/preflight/confirm and pass its version as preflight_version"
}
return true, ""
}
summary, ok := buildPreflightSummary(userID, templateID, normalizeBindingIDs(bindingIDs))
if !ok {
return false, "unknown template_id"
}
if computePreflightVersion(summary) != providedVersion {
return false, "preflight changed since confirmation (resources/template drifted or tampered); re-run preflight confirm and retry"
}
return true, ""
}
// normalizeBindingIDs 去重 + 去非正数,保持顺序(用于 confirm/deploy 的 []int 入参)。
func normalizeBindingIDs(in []int) []int {
out := make([]int, 0, len(in))
seen := map[int]bool{}
for _, n := range in {
if n > 0 && !seen[n] {
seen[n] = true
out = append(out, n)
}
}
return out
}
// computePreflight 是纯函数(无 DB / 无 gin.Context),便于单测。给定模板、已解析的脱敏
@@ -179,30 +280,15 @@ func parsePreflightBindingIDs(c *gin.Context) []int {
return ids
}
// HeicodePreflight: GET /api/heicode/preflight?template_id=&binding_ids=1,2,3 (#39 + #40).
func HeicodePreflight(c *gin.Context) {
userID := c.GetInt("id")
if userID <= 0 {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "authentication required")
return
}
if model.DB == nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "database not initialised")
return
}
templateID := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("template_id"))
if templateID == "" {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "template_id is required")
return
}
// buildPreflightSummary loads the template + resolved (redacted) resource views +
// quota/tier/current-agent state for (userID, templateID, bindingIDs) and computes
// the execution summary. Returns (summary, ok); ok=false means unknown template.
// Shared by the GET preflight, POST confirm, and the deploy-time version check.
func buildPreflightSummary(userID int, templateID string, bindingIDs []int) (preflightSummary, bool) {
tpl, ok := loadAgentTemplate(templateID)
if !ok {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "unknown template_id")
return
return preflightSummary{}, false
}
// 解析请求的绑定 → 脱敏视图;无效/非本人/非 active 的归入 invalidBindings。
bindingIDs := parsePreflightBindingIDs(c)
resources := make([]preflightResource, 0, len(bindingIDs))
invalid := make([]int, 0)
for _, id := range bindingIDs {
@@ -220,8 +306,6 @@ func HeicodePreflight(c *gin.Context) {
HasSecret: strings.TrimSpace(b.SecretRef) != "",
})
}
// 用户剩余额度 + tier 上限 + 当前在跑 agent 数(与部署门禁同口径)。
var remainingQuota int64
if u, err := model.GetUserById(userID, false); err == nil && u != nil {
remainingQuota = int64(u.Quota)
@@ -231,7 +315,94 @@ func HeicodePreflight(c *gin.Context) {
_ = model.DB.Model(&model.AgentDeployment{}).
Where("user_id = ? AND template_id <> '' AND LOWER(status) <> ?", strconv.Itoa(userID), "stopped").
Count(&currentAgents).Error
return computePreflight(tpl, resources, invalid, remainingQuota, common.QuotaPerUnit, maxAgents, int(currentAgents)), true
}
summary := computePreflight(tpl, resources, invalid, remainingQuota, common.QuotaPerUnit, maxAgents, int(currentAgents))
common.ApiSuccess(c, summary)
// HeicodePreflight: GET /api/heicode/preflight?template_id=&binding_ids=1,2,3 (#39 + #40).
func HeicodePreflight(c *gin.Context) {
userID := c.GetInt("id")
if userID <= 0 {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "authentication required")
return
}
if model.DB == nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "database not initialised")
return
}
templateID := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("template_id"))
if templateID == "" {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "template_id is required")
return
}
summary, ok := buildPreflightSummary(userID, templateID, parsePreflightBindingIDs(c))
if !ok {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "unknown template_id")
return
}
common.ApiSuccess(c, withPreflightVersion(summary))
}
// HeicodePreflightConfirm: POST /api/heicode/preflight/confirm (#41).
// Body: {template_id, binding_ids:[...]}. Recomputes the summary, derives a
// tamper-proof version hash over the security-relevant (non-volatile) content,
// and records an audit event (who / when / which version). The client passes the
// returned `version` to POST /api/heicode/agents; deploy re-derives the version
// from the live state and rejects if it changed (resource/template tampered or
// drifted since confirmation).
func HeicodePreflightConfirm(c *gin.Context) {
userID := c.GetInt("id")
if userID <= 0 {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "authentication required")
return
}
if model.DB == nil {
agentError(c, "DEPLOYMENT_PERSIST_FAILED", "database not initialised")
return
}
var req struct {
TemplateID string `json:"template_id"`
BindingIDs []int `json:"binding_ids"`
}
if err := common.UnmarshalBodyReusable(c, &req); err != nil {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "invalid request body")
return
}
req.TemplateID = strings.TrimSpace(req.TemplateID)
if req.TemplateID == "" {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "template_id is required")
return
}
summary, ok := buildPreflightSummary(userID, req.TemplateID, normalizeBindingIDs(req.BindingIDs))
if !ok {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "unknown template_id")
return
}
if !summary.Ready {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "preflight not ready: resolve missing items before confirming")
return
}
version := computePreflightVersion(summary)
// 审计:谁、何时、确认了哪个版本(防篡改版本号 + 模板 + 绑定)。
bindingsJSON, _ := common.Marshal(summary.confirmBindingIDs())
detail, _ := common.Marshal(gin.H{
"version": version,
"template_id": req.TemplateID,
"binding_ids": string(bindingsJSON),
})
model.InsertAgentAuditEvent(&model.AgentAuditEvent{
Event: "preflight.confirmed",
Actor: strconv.Itoa(userID),
UserID: strconv.Itoa(userID),
Resource: "template:" + req.TemplateID,
Result: "ok",
DetailsJSON: string(detail),
})
common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{
"version": version,
"template_id": req.TemplateID,
"summary": withPreflightVersion(summary),
"confirmed": true,
})
}
@@ -79,6 +79,48 @@ func TestComputePreflight_HighRiskEnum(t *testing.T) {
require.True(t, ops[highRiskLargeBudget]) // 标准确认项
}
// #41: 版本哈希对稳定安全面确定且稳定;不随易变预算/在跑数变化。
func TestComputePreflightVersion_StableAndDeterministic(t *testing.T) {
res := []preflightResource{
{BindingID: 1, Type: "git", Provider: "github", Name: "repo", Status: "active", HasSecret: true},
{BindingID: 2, Type: "sk", Provider: "custom", Name: "sk", Status: "active", HasSecret: true},
}
s1 := computePreflight(tpl(), res, nil, 1_000_000, 500000, 5, 1)
s2 := computePreflight(tpl(), res, nil, 7_777_777, 500000, 5, 3) // 预算/在跑数不同
v1 := computePreflightVersion(s1)
require.Equal(t, v1, computePreflightVersion(s2), "版本不应随易变的预算/在跑数变化")
require.True(t, len(v1) > 5 && v1[:5] == "pfv1_")
// 资源顺序不影响版本(内部排序)
resReordered := []preflightResource{res[1], res[0]}
require.Equal(t, v1, computePreflightVersion(computePreflight(tpl(), resReordered, nil, 1, 500000, 5, 0)))
}
// #41: 资源篡改(改 has_secret / 增删资源)→ 版本翻转。
func TestComputePreflightVersion_ChangesOnTamper(t *testing.T) {
base := computePreflight(tpl(), []preflightResource{
{BindingID: 1, Type: "git", Provider: "github", Name: "repo", Status: "active", HasSecret: true},
}, nil, 1_000_000, 500000, 5, 0)
v0 := computePreflightVersion(base)
tampered := computePreflight(tpl(), []preflightResource{
{BindingID: 1, Type: "git", Provider: "github", Name: "repo", Status: "active", HasSecret: false},
}, nil, 1_000_000, 500000, 5, 0)
require.NotEqual(t, v0, computePreflightVersion(tampered), "改 has_secret 应翻转版本")
added := computePreflight(tpl(), []preflightResource{
{BindingID: 1, Type: "git", Provider: "github", Name: "repo", Status: "active", HasSecret: true},
{BindingID: 2, Type: "database", Provider: "postgres", Name: "db", Status: "active", HasSecret: true},
}, nil, 1_000_000, 500000, 5, 0)
require.NotEqual(t, v0, computePreflightVersion(added), "新增资源(引入 db_write 高危)应翻转版本")
}
// #41: normalizeBindingIDs 去重 + 去非正数 + 保序。
func TestNormalizeBindingIDs(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, []int{3, 1, 2}, normalizeBindingIDs([]int{3, 1, 3, 0, 2, -5, 1}))
require.Empty(t, normalizeBindingIDs(nil))
}
// #40 红线:resource 视图序列化后绝不含 secret_ref/channel_id/base_url/price。
func TestComputePreflight_NoSensitiveFieldsLeaked(t *testing.T) {
res := []preflightResource{
+10 -2
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@@ -150,8 +150,9 @@ func HeicodeDeployAgent(c *gin.Context) {
}
var req struct {
TemplateID string `json:"template_id"`
BindingIDs []int `json:"binding_ids"`
TemplateID string `json:"template_id"`
BindingIDs []int `json:"binding_ids"`
PreflightVersion string `json:"preflight_version"`
}
if err := common.UnmarshalBodyReusable(c, &req); err != nil {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", "invalid request body")
@@ -170,6 +171,13 @@ func HeicodeDeployAgent(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
// #41: preflight 防篡改确认校验。默认仅在客户端带了 preflight_version 时校验(向后兼容);
// HEICODE_PREFLIGHT_REQUIRED=true 时强制要求。确认后资源/模板/高危面漂移或被篡改 → 版本不匹配 → 拒绝。
if ok, msg := verifyDeployPreflight(userID, req.TemplateID, req.BindingIDs, req.PreflightVersion); !ok {
agentError(c, "POLICY_REJECTED", msg)
return
}
// Enforce the per-user deployed-agent cap (产品文档「个人5/团队8」). The cap is
// tier-aware (#8): it is the highest MaxAgents among the user's active
// subscription plans, falling back to env HEICODE_MAX_AGENTS_PER_USER
+2 -1
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@@ -535,8 +535,9 @@ func SetApiRouter(router *gin.Engine) {
{
heicodeAgentRoute.GET("/agent-templates", controller.HeicodeListAgentTemplates)
heicodeAgentRoute.GET("/available-models", controller.HeicodeAvailableModels)
// Preflight / execution-summary (#39 缺失项检测 + #40 可读摘要).
// Preflight / execution-summary (#39 缺失项检测 + #40 可读摘要 + #41 confirm/版本).
heicodeAgentRoute.GET("/preflight", controller.HeicodePreflight)
heicodeAgentRoute.POST("/preflight/confirm", controller.HeicodePreflightConfirm)
heicodeAgentRoute.POST("/agents", controller.HeicodeDeployAgent)
heicodeAgentRoute.GET("/agents", controller.HeicodeListAgents)
heicodeAgentRoute.GET("/agents/:deployment_id", controller.HeicodeGetAgent)